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I. INTRODUCTION
O ver the last decade, regulators have imposed multiple tax disclosure requirements on U.S. firms, both in their public financial statements and their confidential federal tax returns. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) implemented Schedule M-3 in 2004, which requires firms to provide on their federal tax returns a detailed reconciliation of financial reporting income to taxable income (IRS, 2004) . In 2007, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) began requiring firms to disclose aggregate reserves for uncertain tax positions in their financial statements (ASC 740-10, avoidance is weaker for multinational firms, consistent with multinational firms perceiving the Schedule M-3 and Schedule UTP to be more informative about their tax avoidance activities. In contrast, the FIN 48 disclosure regime is associated with lower levels of tax avoidance, consistent with firms perceiving the financial statement reserve disclosures to provide incremental information about their tax avoidance activities. The association is stronger for domestic firms, consistent with the aggregated reserves being more informative to the IRS about domestic tax avoidance than multinational tax avoidance.
Our results demand a number of caveats. First, although we do utilize a control group not subject to increased IRS reporting requirements, we cannot establish a causal effect of increased tax disclosures on corporate tax avoidance because our tests only document associations between disclosure regimes and firms' tax outcomes. Second, our empirical measure of tax avoidance is indirect in that it captures both tax planning strategies and business decisions that affect cash tax payments. Although we include multiple variables in our empirical tests to control for business decisions, institutional features prevent us from being able to fully isolate tax planning strategies.
2 Third, although we include firms not subject to the tax return disclosure requirements in our analyses to control for contemporaneous events, we cannot fully rule out the possibility that the increased levels of tax avoidance we document over our sample period could be explained in part by changes in the economy, such as the Great Recession. Finally, we assume that behavioral changes in response to new disclosure regimes will occur within the first few years after the disclosure becomes effective. However, firms could have responded to the increased disclosure requirements in a delayed manner, which makes attributing the effect of any specific disclosure requirement on tax avoidance more difficult.
3 Despite these caveats, we believe that the associations we document are broadly consistent with firms perceiving the Schedule M-3 and Schedule UTP disclosure requirements to be more informative about multinational firms' tax avoidance and the FIN 48 disclosure requirement to be more informative about domestic firms' tax avoidance.
Our study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, prior research has generally investigated the short-term effects of these three disclosure requirements on firm behavior (e.g., Blouin et al., 2010; Donohoe and McGill, 2011; Robinson and Schmidt, 2013; Abernathy, Davenport, and Rapley, 2013; Towery, 2016) . What remains unclear is whether the short-term changes in behavior (if any) have persisted over time. Our goal 2 For example, the non-linearity of depreciation schedules over time limits our ability to fully control for the effect of depreciation deductions on cash tax payments. is to begin to provide a better understanding of whether over the long run these three major disclosure requirements have coincided with changes in corporate tax avoidance. Second, Dyreng et al. (forthcoming) considers whether other regulatory and legislative changes (Sarbanes-Oxley, check-the-box regulations, the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, and bonus depreciation rules) are associated with overall trends in corporate tax avoidance. Our study complements their work by investigating the relation between mandatory tax disclosure requirements and tax avoidance and whether the relation differs for domestic and multinational firms. The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we further discuss Schedule M-3, FIN 48, and Schedule UTP. We discuss our sample selection procedures, empirical models, and results in Section III, and we conclude in Section IV.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Schedule M-3
The IRS (2004) Spanning three full pages, the aim of Schedule M-3 was to address the shortcomings of its predecessor, Schedule M-1, which was first introduced in 1963. Although Schedule M-1 required a ten line reconciliation of net income per books to taxable income, it did not provide the level of detail needed for the IRS to efficiently evaluate compliance risk (Mills and Plesko, 2003; Boynton and Mills, 2004) . Schedule M-3 expanded the booktax reconciliation in two ways. First, Part I of Schedule M-3 reconciles a taxpayer's worldwide book income to the book income of entities included in the federal tax return. Second, Parts II and III of Schedule M-3 provide a detailed reconciliation of the book income of entities included in the federal tax return to taxable income and require taxpayers to disclose whether each book-tax difference is temporary or permanent.
Despite Schedule M-3 receiving much attention from practitioners and the FASB when introduced by the IRS, to our knowledge academic research to date has been limited to two studies on Schedule M-3: Donohoe and McGill (2011) and Hope, Ma, and Thomas (2013) . Both of these studies suggest Schedule M-3 had significant short-term effects on firms. Donohoe and McGill (2011) investigate the initial investor perceptions of the costs and benefits of Schedule M-3 and whether Schedule M-3 had an immediate effect on firm behavior. Their analyses suggest: (1) investors had a negative perception of Schedule M-3; (2) the investors' perception was more negative among investors in firms with greater tax avoidance; and (3) firms avoided less taxes immediately after Schedule M-3 became required. Hope, Ma, and Thomas (2013) examines whether the change from mandatory to voluntary disclosure of geographic earnings in accordance with ASC 280-10, Segment Reporting (hereinafter "SFAS 131"), led to increased tax avoidance for non-disclosing firms. The FASB adopted SFAS 131, which removed the financial reporting requirement to disclose geographic earnings by jurisdiction, in 1997 jurisdiction, in (FASB, 1997 . The authors predict that SFAS 131 enables non-disclosers of geographic earnings to avoid more taxes. The results are consistent with this hypothesis, but the subsequent introduction of Schedule M-3 mitigated the effect to some extent for geographic non-disclosers because it requires a more detailed reconciliation of book income to taxable income.
Our study builds on prior work in two ways. First, we examine the long-run association between the Schedule M-3 regime and corporate tax avoidance. Because Donohoe and McGill (2011) and Hope, Ma, and Thomas (2013) report that firms decreased tax avoidance in response to Schedule M-3 in the short-run, we test the following hypothesis:
H1: The Schedule M-3 regime is associated with lower levels of tax avoidance.
Second, we examine whether and how the association differs for domestic and multinational firms because Schedule M-3 provides different information for firms with varying degrees of international operations. As mentioned before, Schedule M-3 Part I requires a reconciliation of a consolidated entity's worldwide book income to the book income of entities included in the federal tax return. Firms are then only required to disclose detailed book-tax differences for the book income of entities included in the federal tax return (in Parts II and III of Schedule M-3). To the extent a multinational firm's income and expense items escape detailed reconciliation because some entities are not included on the tax return, the Schedule M-3 could provide the IRS with more useful information for domestic firms than for multinational firms. On the other hand, Schedule M-3 could be more useful in the audit of multinational firms because the gap between worldwide book income and book income of entities included in the federal tax return provides the IRS with a useful starting point in identifying multinational firms for audit. Thus, whether the association between the Schedule M-3 regime and tax avoidance is different for domestic and multinational firms is an empirical question.
B. FIN 48
The FASB issued FIN 48 in 2007 to reduce diversity in practice in recognizing, measuring, and disclosing financial reporting reserves for uncertain tax positions (FAF, 2012) . FIN 48 requires a firm to evaluate each tax position using a two-step process. A firm is first required to determine whether it is more likely than not (MLTN) that a tax position will be sustained upon audit based upon the technical merits of the position. The firm must assume the tax authority knows all relevant information and assessments of audit probability cannot enter into the MLTN determination. If the position does not meet the MLTN threshold, a full reserve for the benefits of the position must be recorded as a liability. If the position meets the MLTN threshold, the firm will recognize a tax benefit equal to the amount which is cumulatively greater than 50 percent likely to be realized upon settlement. FIN 48 also requires firms to provide numerous disclosures related to uncertain tax positions in their public financial statements, including: a reconciliation of the beginning and ending balance of uncertain tax benefits, the amount of unrecognized tax benefits that would impact the effective tax rate if recognized, the amount of accrued interest and penalties arising from the unrecognized tax benefits, a brief description of open tax years by major jurisdiction, and a discussion of whether the firm expects any changes to the unrecognized tax benefit balance within the next twelve months.
Multiple studies have examined the consequences of FIN 48. 4 In a summary of the academic work related to the consequences of FIN 48, Blouin and Robinson (2014) concludes that firms changed their behavior with respect to interacting with tax authorities in anticipation of FIN 48 and that firms' tax planning strategies became less aggressive after FIN 48. However, many of these studies focus on changes in firm behavior either around adoption or shortly thereafter and few focus on changes in firm behavior for different subsets of firms. Now that sufficient time has passed since FIN 48 adoption, we examine whether the FIN 48 time period coincides with a long-term reduction in corporate tax avoidance. Because prior research finds that FIN 48 had a short-run effect on tax avoidance, we test the following hypothesis:
H2: The FIN 48 regime is associated with lower levels of tax avoidance.
We also argue that financial statement reserves for uncertain tax positions disclosed by domestic firms may be more useful to the IRS than reserves for uncertain tax positons disclosed by multinational firms. Although FIN 48 requires firms to disclose information about their uncertain tax positions, the disclosed reserves are aggregated across jurisdictions. However, in the case of a domestic firm, a substantial portion of the reserves likely relate to positions claimed on the U.S. tax return. 5 In other words, a $10 million unrecognized tax benefit balance reported by a domestic firm is likely more informative to the IRS than a $10 million balance reported by a multinational firm. We therefore posit that FIN 48 disclosure requirements could be more informative to tax authorities about domestic firms' tax avoidance than multinational firms' tax avoidance.
C. Schedule UTP
On January 26, 2010, IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman introduced Schedule UTP in a speech made to the New York State Bar Association Taxation Section. In his remarks, he emphasized a desire to increase efficiency in the audit process and to reduce the amount of time the IRS spent searching for taxpayer issues (Shulman, 2010) . When Schedule UTP was finalized on September 24, 2010, it required disclosure of the indi-vidual uncertain tax positions comprising the U.S. portion of a firms' unrecognized tax benefit balance. Schedule UTP was required in 2010 for firms with at least $100 million of total assets, in 2012 for firms with at least $50 million of total assets, and in 2014 for firms with at least $10 million of total assets.
Firms are not required to disclose the actual dollar value of the uncertain tax positions on Schedule UTP. Rather, Schedule UTP requires firms to rank their uncertain tax positions by size and designate as major tax positions those that constitute at least 10 percent of the aggregate positions disclosed on Schedule UTP. Part III of Schedule UTP requires firms to provide a concise description of each uncertain tax position listed on Part I (tax positions claimed in the current year) and Part II (tax positions claimed in a prior year) of Schedule UTP.
To our knowledge, only two studies to date examine the consequences of Schedule UTP. Abernathy, Davenport, and Rapley (2013) documents a lower level of financial statement tax reserves related to positions claimed in the current year after Schedule UTP was announced. As the authors acknowledge, a reduction in current-year reserves could be interpreted in two ways: (1) firms claimed fewer uncertain tax positions as a result of Schedule UTP; or (2) firms continued claiming uncertain tax positions but found ways to avoid recording reserves in their financial statements in order to avoid Schedule UTP disclosure. Towery (2016) uses confidential tax return data to disentangle these two explanations. She finds that firms continued claiming uncertain tax positions on their tax returns despite reporting lower reserves, suggesting that firms used discretion in the application of FIN 48 to avoid reporting reserves for these positions in the financial statements.
Similar to research on Schedule M-3 and FIN 48, the analyses conducted by Abernathy, Davenport, and Rapley (2013) and Towery (2016) are focused on the immediate effects of a new disclosure requirement on firm behavior. Now that some time has passed since the introduction of Schedule UTP, we examine whether over the long run Schedule UTP is associated with corporate tax avoidance. Given that Towery (2016) finds that Schedule UTP had no short-run effect on tax avoidance, we test the following hypothesis:
H3: The Schedule UTP regime is not associated with levels of tax avoidance.
Because the aggregate unrecognized tax benefit balances disclosed in accordance with FIN 48 likely provide more relevant information to the IRS about domestic firms, we argue that Schedule UTP disclosures for multinational firms are more informative to the IRS than Schedule UTP disclosures for domestic firms. Specifically, the Schedule UTP now enables the IRS to observe whether the financial statement reserves for multinational corporations relate to U.S. positions. While the IRS still receives additional information about domestic firms' tax avoidance activities on Schedule UTP that could not be gleaned from FIN 48 disclosure alone, the IRS likely gains more information about multinational firms' tax avoidance activities. If so, we would expect multinational firms to avoid fewer taxes than domestic firms after Schedule UTP.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
A. Sample
Table 1 describes our sample derivation. Our initial sample includes 167,687 firmyear observations in Compustat from 2000 through 2014. This 15-year sample period enables us to establish a baseline level of pre-disclosure tax avoidance and to examine variation in tax avoidance across our three tax disclosure regimes (Schedule M-3, FIN 48, and Schedule UTP).
We impose five sample selection criteria. First, we exclude firms incorporated outside the United States because they are not necessarily subject to U.S. disclosure regimes. Second, we exclude the redundant effect of subsidiary observations. Third, we exclude pass-through observations because pass-through entities are not taxed at the entity level. Fourth, we exclude observations with missing values of control variables. Finally, we exclude observations with missing values of Delta_MVA, our measure of corporate tax avoidance. These criteria yield a sample of 59,541 observations. In additional analysis, we also restrict our sample to a balanced panel of 22,096 firm-year observations.
B. Model of the Associations between Tax Disclosure Regimes and Tax Avoidance
We first examine overall variation in tax avoidance across disclosure regimes. Because we are interested in the economic outcomes associated with enhanced disclosure periods, we focus on a cash-based measure of tax avoidance developed by Henry and Sansing (2016) , Delta_MVA. Similar to the cash effective tax rate, Delta_MVA captures anything that causes cash taxes paid to differ from the product of the statutory tax rate times pre-tax book income. Delta_MVA equals the difference between cash taxes paid (TXPD) and the statutory tax rate (35 percent in our sample period) times pre-tax book income (PI-SPI), which is then scaled by the market value of assets (total assets+(market value of equity-book value of equity)). Unlike some other measures of corporate tax avoidance, Delta_MVA is defined for both profit and loss firms, enabling us to examine tax avoidance across disclosure regimes for the full sample of firms subject to the disclosure regulations, as opposed to a subsample of only profitable firm-year observations. 6 Further, for ease of economic interpretation, dividing Delta_MVA by the pre-tax return on assets transforms it into the difference between a firm's cash effective tax rate and the statutory tax rate.
As previously discussed, Schedule M-3 became effective in 2004 for firms with at least $10 million in total assets, FIN 48 became effective in 2007 for all firms reporting under U.S. GAAP, and Schedule UTP became effective in 2010 for firms with at least $100 million in total assets, in 2012 for firms with at least $50 million in total assets, and in 2014 for firms with at least $10 million in total assets. Each of the three disclosure regimes are captured with the following three indicator variables: M3, FIN48, and UTP. The disclosure regime indicators are dependent upon a firm's fiscal year end and its asset size.
M3 equals one if the firm must comply with Schedule M-3 during the fiscal year, and zero otherwise. Thus, M3 is equal to one for fiscal years 2004 through 2014, and zero otherwise. FIN48 equals one if the firm must comply with FIN 48 during the fiscal year, and zero otherwise. Thus, FIN48 is equal to one for fiscal years 2007 through 2014, and zero otherwise. Because the Schedule UTP requirement is phased in over the period 2010 through 2014, UTP is measured differently depending on firm size. Thus, UTP is equal to one if: (1) total assets are greater than or equal to $100 million and the fiscal year is in 2010 through 2014; (2) total assets are greater than or equal to $50 million and less than $100 million and the fiscal year is in 2012 through 2014; or Note: This table summarizes our sample derivation process. 6 Other measures of corporate tax avoidance include: (1) the ratio of cash taxes paid to pre-tax book income (cash effective tax rate); (2) the ratio of financial statement tax expense to pre-tax book income (GAAP effective tax rate); and (3) a book-tax difference measure that captures the difference between pre-tax book income and estimated taxable income. Studies using these measures of tax avoidance typically delete observations with negative pre-tax income and/or negative current tax expense because the resulting effective tax rate or book-tax difference is not meaningful (Henry and Sansing, 2016) .
(3) total assets are greater than or equal to $10 million and less than $50 million and the fiscal year is 2014 -UTP is zero otherwise. We define our regime variables this way so that the coefficient estimates capture the incremental effect of a disclosure regime relative to the period prior to the start of the regime (e.g., the coefficient estimate for FIN48 captures the effect of FIN 48 relative to the period prior to FIN 48). 7 Because lower levels of Delta_MVA imply greater tax avoidance, we interpret a positive (negative) coefficient on M3, FIN48, or UTP as the disclosure regime being associated with lower (higher) levels of tax avoidance.
We include firms with less than $10 million in total assets as our control sample because they are not subject to Schedule M-3 or Schedule UTP. Doing so enables us to control for other systematic events or economic changes that occur throughout our sample period. However, all firms in our sample, regardless of asset size, are subject to the reporting requirements under FIN 48. Thus, we lack an appropriate control group to separate the association between increased disclosures required under FIN 48 and tax avoidance from the effects of other systematic events occurring during the FIN 48 period. We have chosen to set FIN 48 indicators to zero for firms with total assets of less than $10 million to maintain the consistency of our control sample across disclosure regimes. We acknowledge this design choice is imperfect and impacts the interpretation of our results with respect to the association between the FIN 48 disclosure regime and tax avoidance.
To rule out additional alternative explanations for the variation in tax avoidance across tax disclosure regimes, we also control for the following firm characteristics: size (Size), profitability (ROA), leverage (Leverage), intangible assets (Intan), advertising expenses (Advertising), capital expenditures (CapEx), net operating loss carryforwards (NOL), gross property, plant, and equipment (PPE), selling, general and administrative expenses (SGA), and research and development expenditures (RD) (Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Mills, Erickson, and Maydew, 1998; Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2010) . Continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent. All variables are defined in the Appendix. We cluster standard errors by firm. We estimate (1) over the period 2000 through 2014 in both a pooled sample of all firm-year observations and in a balanced panel of firms.
To examine the differential associations between the tax disclosure regimes and tax avoidance for domestic and multinational firms, we estimate (1) separately for the subsample of firms with only domestic operations and the subsample of firms with multinational operations. We consider a firm to be a domestic firm if pre-tax foreign earnings (PIFO) are missing or equal to zero. We consider a firm to be a multinational firm if pre-tax foreign earnings (PIFO) are non-missing and not equal to zero (i.e., the firm reports foreign profits or losses). All other variables are defined above. We perform this set of analyses on both the pooled sample of domestic and multinational firm-year observations and the balanced panels of domestic and multinational firms from 2000 through 2014. Table 2 Panel A provides descriptive statistics for our full sample. Mean (median) Delta_MVA equals 0.0135 (-0.0005). Negative (positive) values of Delta_MVA indicate that a firm's cash taxes paid are less than (more than) the statutory tax rate times its pre-tax income; thus, a firm is said to be in a favorable (unfavorable) tax position. The average firm in our sample has approximately $4 billion in total assets (untabulated). The interquartile range for ROA suggests wide variation in profitability, and approximately 46 percent of sample firms report net operating loss carryforwards. On the whole, the distribution of our variables is similar to previous studies of tax avoidance.
C. Results
Panel B of Table 2 describes our tax avoidance measure by disclosure regime for our control sample of firms with total assets less than $10 million, the subsample of multinational corporations, and the subsample of domestic corporations. We plot the mean values of Delta_MVA by disclosure regime in Figure 1 . Figure 1 provides preliminary evidence of overall higher tax avoidance coinciding with the IRS tax disclosure regimes (Schedule UTP and Schedule M-3) and lower tax avoidance coinciding with the FIN 48 regime. However, because of the need to control for profitability and the opportunities and incentives for tax avoidance when examining the associations between tax disclosure regimes and tax avoidance, we next conduct formal tests of the changes in tax avoidance across tax disclosure regimes using our multivariate regression framework. Table 3 presents our multivariate results on the association between the mandatory disclosure regimes and tax avoidance for firms subject to the disclosures relative to a control sample of firm-year observations with less than $10 million in total assets. Panel A presents our estimation of (1) for the pooled sample and Panel B presents our estimation of (1) for a balanced panel of firms. We find that tax avoidance is higher for firms subject to Schedule M-3 disclosure requirements than for those firms that were not. Specifically, our results suggest that the cash taxes paid relative to pre-tax book income (i.e., cash effective tax rate) for the balanced panel of firms subject to Schedule M-3 decreased by 8 percentage points relative to the control sample (estimated coefficient estimate of -0.0043 divided by an average pre-tax ROA for firms with assets greater than $10 million of 0.0521). Overall, our results are inconsistent with Hypothesis H1, suggesting that the immediate effect of Schedule M-3 was short-lived because the Schedule M-3 disclosure regime is not associated with lower levels of tax avoidance in the long run.
Relative to firms with less than $10 million in total assets and relative to the period prior to FIN 48, tax avoidance was lower in the years firms were required by FIN 48 to disclose their unrecognized tax benefits. Within the balanced panel of firms, cash taxes paid relative to pre-tax book income increased by 7 percentage points for the firms subject to FIN 48 relative to the control sample after the introduction of the increased disclosure requirements of FIN 48. This is consistent with prior studies documenting a decrease in tax avoidance immediately after FIN 48 (e.g., Graham et al., 2014; Gupta, Mills, and Towery, 2014) and suggests a longer-term impact of financial statement disclosures on tax avoidance, consistent with Hypothesis H2.
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics Finally, we find a negative association between UTP and Delta_MVA, consistent with tax avoidance being higher during the Schedule UTP regime relative to the preSchedule UTP regime and the control sample of firms not required to file Schedule UTP. Again, this result is economically significant. Within the balanced sample of firms, cash taxes paid relative to pre-tax book income decreased by 6 percentage points for firms required to file Schedule UTP relative to the control sample after the introduction of Schedule UTP. This result is inconsistent with Hypothesis H3 but consistent with the finding in Green and Plesko (2016) that firms' book-tax differences were higher in the Schedule UTP regime.
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In sum, we find main effects of increased tax disclosures that are consistent with our univariate trends. The negative associations between the Schedule M-3 and Schedule Because our sample period ends in 2014, it is possible that our results with respect to the Schedule UTP regime are understated due to the fact that we are unable to examine a long-term period in which Schedule UTP was required across all firms with total assets greater than $10 million. UTP disclosure regimes and tax avoidance are surprising given the ex ante concerns that both disclosures would provide more information about tax avoidance activities to the IRS. These results provide preliminary evidence that firms did not view the Schedule M-3 and the Schedule UTP as informative to the IRS. However, the positive association between the FIN 48 disclosure regime and tax avoidance suggests firms perceived FIN 48 disclosures to be informative to tax authorities. Table 4 presents the results for estimating (1) for our domestic firm and multinational firm subsamples. Our analysis for the pooled sample of firms is presented in Panel A and our analysis for a balanced panel of firms is presented in Panel B. Consistent with Schedule M-3 providing more useful information to the IRS for multinational firms, we find that the negative association between the Schedule M-3 regime and tax avoidance is stronger for domestic firms than for multinational firms in both the pooled sample and in the balanced panel. This suggests multinational firms either perceived Schedule M-3 as informative to the IRS about their tax avoidance activities and/or the Schedule M-3 was more useful to the IRS in examining multinational firms relative to domestic firms.
In the pooled sample of firms and in the balanced panel, we find that the positive association between the FIN 48 regime and tax avoidance is stronger for domestic firms than for multinational firms. We view this evidence as consistent with domestic firms viewing the FIN 48 disclosure as a better roadmap to tax authorities relative to multinational firms because operating in fewer jurisdictions likely increases the information content of the disclosures to tax authorities. In the pooled sample of firms and in the balanced panel, we find that the negative association between the Schedule UTP regime and Delta_MVA is stronger for domestic firms than for multinational firms, consistent with Schedule UTP providing more useful information to the IRS for multinational firms relative to domestic firms.
Overall, the results in Table 4 suggest the Schedule M-3 and Schedule UTP disclosures are more informative to the IRS about multinational firms, while FIN 48 is more informative to the IRS about domestic firms.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the IRS and the FASB have implemented new disclosure requirements for corporate taxpayers over the last decade, academics have spent considerable effort examining the immediate consequences of these disclosure requirements. While the profession has learned a great deal from these studies, we seek to better understand whether over the long run, Schedule M-3, FIN 48, and Schedule UTP have coincided with changes in corporate tax avoidance. We also investigate whether the associations between the disclosure regimes and corporate tax avoidance differ for domestic and multinational firms.
We find that the tax return disclosure regimes (Schedule M-3 and Schedule UTP) are associated with higher levels of tax avoidance. While we are careful to not imply causality, these results suggest firms do not perceive the Schedule M-3 and the Schedule UTP as informative to the IRS. However, the associations between the Schedule M-3 and Schedule UTP disclosure regimes and corporate tax avoidance are weaker for multinational firms, consistent with multinational firms perceiving the tax return disclosures to be more informative about their tax avoidance activities. The FIN 48 disclosure regime is associated with lower levels of tax avoidance, suggesting firms perceive that the tax reserves reported in the financial statements provide information to the IRS about their tax avoidance activities. The association is stronger for domestic firms, suggesting the aggregated reserves are more informative to the IRS about domestic firms' tax avoidance than multinational firms' tax avoidance.
What bears consideration going forward is why tax avoidance appears to be higher in the most recent years of our study. We find this result rather puzzling, as it is in this time period that firms are subject to all three of these highly detailed disclosure requirements. One possible explanation is that managers have found ways to avoid the disclosure requirements (e.g., recording fewer reserves for uncertain tax positions in the financial statements in order to avoid Schedule UTP disclosure). Overall, these findings should be informative to tax authorities and the FASB as they continue to refine existing disclosure requirements.
